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Constructing Justice: Theories of the
Subject in Law and Literature
Betsy B. Baker*
The subject, its attributes, and the limitations it imposes on theory are
not easily done away with, as all our history (the history of philosophy, of ideas, of literature, of events, and even political and social history) attests. If this... can be challenged, it is not through a simple
rejection of the subject .... A truly radical questioning of the subject,
and the resulting emergence of processes, areas of theory and practice, and strategies not totally dependent on the subject can only be
realized by a repeated working through and undermining of the
premises on which the subject depends and which depend on it.1

Critics of the legal system have long observed its tendency
to distort pr ignore connections between its human subjects and
the empirical world of their experience.2 Disregard for the subject's non-theoretical experience also appears in the attempts of
certain literary critics to redefine or even remove the concept
of the subject from literary theory.3 In opposition to law's an*
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thank Gerald Torres for his encouragement and comments on earlier versions
of this Essay.
1. D. CARROLL, THE SuBJEcT IN QUESTION 26 (1982).
2. See generally B. EDELMAN, OWNERSHIP OF THE IMAGE: ELEMENTS FOR

A MARXIST THEORY OF LAW 25 (E. Kingdom trans. 1979) (introduction by Paul
Q. Hirst) ("[The jurist's] 'soul', that is, his illusion of taking juridical relations
to be human relations, is the soul of an owner and a shareholder .... 1"); id. at
147 (19th century child as juridical person); id. at 151-62 (Kant's discussion of
jus realiterpersonale,the "right of possession of an external object as a thing
and to make use of it as a person"); idi at 178-91 (Hegel's subject in law and
property as embodiment of personality); Gabel, Intention and Structure in
Contractual Conditions: Outline of a Method for Critical Legal Theory, 61
MINN. L. REV. 601, 634 (1977) (discussing Law as an alienated interpretation of
relations between parties); Weinrib, Legal Formalism: On the Immanent Rationality of Law, 97 YALE L.J. 949, 976 (1988) (discussing formalism's abstract
conception of juridical relationships).
3. See generally J. GALLOP, THE DAUGHTER'S SEDUCTION 12 (1982) (there

is no place for a "subject" to be human or to make sense outside of linguistic
signification); J. DERRIDA, LIMITED INC 36 (1988) (using the concept of incorporation to disregard the individual subject while formulating arguments and
theories that will affect that subject). In addition, this Essay's discussion of
the work of Paul de Man and Jean-Francois Lyotard considers their attempts
to redefine concepts of the subject in literary theory.
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tisubjective tendencies and perhaps in response to literary critics' questioning of the subject, several legal theorists who would
not otherwise be aligned argue separately that the legal system
needs to admit more subjective concerns to legal discourse and
to recognize more the humanity of the subject in law.4 This

range of legal scholars includes scientific legal realists and
members of the loosely structured congerie of critical legal
scholars, all of whom share a concern that the voice of the legal
subject be heard in law.
As a preliminary exploration of the treatment of the subject in literature and law, I propose to examine the works of
several literary and legal critics. Paul de Man and Jean-Frangois Lyotard offer complementary observations on the subject
in literature while Steve Fuller and John T. Noonan Jr. concern themselves with the place of the subject in law.5
This Essay is an initial attempt to join in this discussion of
subject, to pose questions regarding the relation of literary theory to legal theory and practice, and to inquire whether that relation affects subjects within the legal system. I offer not so
much a critique as an attempt to explicate the approaches of
several thoughtful critics who discuss how the subject is constituted in literature and in law. As a lawyer new to the world of
literary criticism, my focus is on better understanding critical
theories in literature before deciding whether to import them
(or prevent their migration) into the legal system. The resulting dearth of concrete legal examples in this Essay is one for
which I ask the patience of my law colleagues.
A proposal from Judge Noonan 6 provides a convenient entry point into the discussion of the subject in the legal system:
The central problem, I think, of the legal enterprise is the relation of
love to power. We can often apply force to those we do not see, but
we cannot, I think, love them. Only in the response of person to person can Augustine's sublime fusion be achieved, in which justice is de4. See C. MACKINNON, FEMINISM UNMODIFIED, DISCOURSES ON LIFE AND
10 (1987); J. NOONAN JR., PERSONS AND MASKS OF THE LAW 20, 41-43
(1976); Singer, The Playerand the Cards: Nihilism and Legal Theory, 94 YALE
L.J. 1, 66-70 (1984); Fuller, Playing Without a Full Deck Scientific Realism
and the Cognitive Limits of Legal Theory, 97 YALE L.J. 549, 549-50, 555-56, 575
n.2 (1988).
5. Whether these critics have anything to say to each other within their
respective circles of literature and law, and whether those conversations can
cross from one discipline to the other, remains to be seen. The debate whether
literary theory can offer any guidance to legal interpretation, while pertinent,
is beyond the scope of this Essay.
6. Judge Noonan posed the problem while still a full-time professor of
law, before his appointment to the bench.
LAw
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'
fined as "love serving only the one loved.

7

Lyotard and de Man would deride this unabashedly organic, intersubjective statement for its reliance on communication between empirical human beings to solve the posed problem of
how law relates love to power. Noonan's statement sharply
contradicts the desire of Lyotard and de Man to distinguish the
living, breathing, empirical subject from the ontological, discursive subject s and thereby diminish or remove the power of the
empirical subject in systems of discourse. In the theoretical
models that de Man and Lyotard envision (sketched simplistically for the moment) the concept of "relation" poses problems
by raising questions of authority and reception in discourse, and
suggesting that empirical subjects can communicate effectively
with each other. Determining the degree to which communication can occur between subjects - ontological and/or empirical
is of common interest to de Man, Lyotard, and Noonan; their
varied responses provide the grist for the discourse that follows.
I.

THEORIES OF THE SUBJECT IN LITERATURE

As Lyotard would have us understand the rules for engaging in a particular discourse or language game, I should note
some ground rules for this discussion. In this Essay, I treat the
terms "subject" and "self" as possessing a certain degree of interchangeability, recognizing that one term can never completely substitute for the other. I also alert the reader to
potential confusion of the empirical and ontological subjects,
admitting that I will both knowingly and unintentionally engage in some of that confusion. De Man warns against the tendency to "relapse unwittingly into the concerns of the self as
they exist in the empirical world,"9 noting "how difficult it is to
remain rigorously confined to the disinterestedness of non-em7.
8.

J. NOONAN, JR., supra note 4, at xii.
For the purposes of this Essay, the concept of "discursive subject" re-

fers to the discursive subject - human or otherwise - or that part of the subject that cannot be contained in the physical world, that may exist only in
theory, that cannot be touched but can be posited in discourse using written or
oral language. Its existence can in one sense be described as linguistic. The
term "ontological" helps to describe this conception of the subject by implying
its relation to ontology, "the branch of metaphysics dealing with the nature of
being, reality, or ultimate substance." WEBsTER's NEW WORLD DIcTIoNARY OF
THE AMERICAN LANGUAGE 995 (2d College ed. 1986). In contrast, the empirical
subject exists in the observable world of practical experience.
9. P. DE MAN, BLINDNESS AND INSIGHT: ESSAYS IN THE RHETORIC OF
CONTEMPORARY CRITICISM 38 (W. Godzich trans. 2d ed. 1983).
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pirical thought."' 0 My lapses into confusion of the empirical
and ontological selves are due to interest in questions that the
failure to connect the two concepts raises. I indulge in these
lapses in hopes that they will have some of the revelatory quality that de Man attributes to them.
De Man notes that such "onto-ontological confusion occurs
in the most revealing manner.... [being] in the long run more
instructive than the peremptory dismissal of the question of the
subject on historical grounds."'" Indeed, neither de Man nor
Lyotard dismiss the subject out of hand, but undertake closely
to examine its constitutive components. 12 De Man identifies a
major contribution of twentieth century literary criticism as
"establishing [the] crucial distinction between an empirical and
an ontological self."' 3 Separating these two elements of the
self, however, can result in a failure to recognize what effect
they have on each other and how the empirical self affects the
structural functioning of the ontological self. Such recognition
is crucial to an operative literary theory such as de Man's that
posits that the ontological self derives in part from questioning
the empirical self; a derivation that does not assign to the empirical self the role of creator. 14
In the legal system, where the human subject has long
been categorized and treated as a structural, functional entity,
the disappearance of the empirical being as referent is perhaps
the main impetus behind the call for more consideration of the
human being in legal decisions.15 That call may also reflect a
desire to recognize the differences between juridical (ontologi10. Id- at 49.
11. Id. at 39.
12. Carroll, whose quotation begins this Essay, also argues against "a simple rejection of the subject," relying on Foucault's "overtly antisubject
archaeological approach to history" as his model for a criticism which rejects
the concept of the subject only after discrediting it as "derivative, an abstraction, the principal obstacle to the development of a science of discourse." D.
CARROLL, supra note 1, at 121.
13. P. DE MAN, supra note 9, at 50.
14. De Man claims that the relationship that Georges Poulet describes between the actual self and the "deeper" self "exists first of all in the form of a
radical questioning [in language] of the actual, given self, extending to the
point of annihilation." Id. at 98. "But if the subject is, in its turn, given the
status of origin, one makes it coincide with Being in a self-consuming identity
in which language is destroyed." Id at 100-01; see also id at 105 (further discussing Poulet's assertions).
15. Noonan and Fuller offer two versions of this call for the legal system
to consider more subjective, human concerns in its decisions. See infra Section
III.
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cal) and empirical selves and to acknowledge that what happens to the juridical subject affects the empirical subject.
Lawyers, judges, jurors and other actors in the legal system
each take part in constituting the juridical subject. Although
literature lacks the structural equivalent of outside parties
helping to constitute the subject, the comparison of how legal
subjects and literary subjects are constituted is still instructive.
De Man's treatment of the self that constitutes its own language offers one such basis for comparison.
De Man's discussion of "the self that writes" highlights
how various functions of the empirical and ontological selves
can combine and divide within a subject.16 The self that writes
appears in "the intentional relationship that exists, within the
work, between the constitutive subject and the constituted language," 17 converting a subject/object relationship to one of subject/language. This conversion can only occur within time,
which is the essential common experience of all subjects. In
various moments, the self (the subject) is divided within a
structure of time; temporality is thus constitutive and provides
the situs for the act of writing itself. A writer's reception of a
text involves the subject's participation in the constitution of
the work; it is a temporal act by which the subject becomes the
self that writes. By identifying with the author, the empirical
critic/subject experiences an internal division from which language is produced, yet language also expresses the subject's
very experience of time. At that moment of instantaneous
transition, "linstant de passage," from experience to writing,
the empirical self decides to write and moves to the ontological
level, leaving behind a separate empirical self.'8
This move, occurring in an instant de passage, makes time
an element of the discursive, ontological self that writes. Yet
16. The self that writes is among the four types of relationships between
"a plurality of subjects" that de Man identifies as posing "the question of the
self." That question appears in
the act of judgment that takes place in the mind of the reader; it appears next in the apparently intersubjective relationships that are es-

tablished between the author and the reader; it governs the
intentional relationship that exists, within the work, between the constitutive subject and the constituted language; it can be sought, finally, in the relationship that the subject establishes, through the
mediation of the work, with itself. From the start, we have at least
four possible and distinct types of self: the self that judges, the self
that reads, the self that writes, and the self that reads itself.
P. DE MAN, supra note 9, at 39.
17. Id.
18. I& at 98-99.

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 75:581

time - the very thing that constitutes the new ontological self
is also the thing from which both the empirical and ontological selves seek to escape. Time limits and traps the empirical
self and ontological self alike, and both are denied authenticity
in de Man's understanding of time. In de Man's instant de passage, irony splits the subject into two instantaneous elements
that differ from each other: "An empirical self that exists in a
state of inauthenticity and a self that exists only in the form of
language that asserts the knowledge of this inauthenticity...
[but] to know inauthenticity is not the same as to be authentic."'19 This formulation denies authenticity to both the discursive and empirical subjects. Only language can claim
authenticity; the discursive self constituted in language cannot.
Is this authenticity time or death or both? Or is it some
form of immortality that transcends time? If time is the only
'authentic experience, yet neither subject is authentic, why is
either one trying to escape a temporal dilemma? Is it impossible or just extremely painful for a non-authentic subject to
exist in the authentic dimension of time? For de Man, authenticity is the absence of signification of empirical existence. He
speaks of the difference between a "false kind of transcendence
that bases poetic immortality on the exemplary destiny of the
poet considered as a person" and "authentic poetic immortality
that is entirely devoid of any personal circumstances." 20 An authentic subject bears no relation to any objectifiable, empirical
self.
Removing the empirical self from the temporal realm of
authenticity gives to language a subjectivity and immortality of
its own. De Man's empirical subject lacks authenticity because
language, not physical being, is the future-oriented means to escape time. A human being cannot conquer time, but language
can. "Language, however, is not a source; it is the articulation
of the self and language that acquires a degree of prospective
power." 21 So language articulates the experience of the subject,
returning us to the discursive "self that writes" in which the
self constitutes its own language and can only express its experience of time in language. At this point, the subject can only
operate at a discursive level, communicating with other discursive subjects but no longer able to communicate with empirical
subjects. De Man states that: "the dimension of futurity... ex19. Id. at 214.
20. Id. at 180.
21. Id. at 100.
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ists neither as an empirical reality nor in the consciousness of
the subject. It exists only in the form of a written language
that relates in its turn to other written languages in the history
of literature and criticism." 22 De Man's reference to history
seems an oddly retrograde homage to the past, sounding as it
does in the same breath with his call for a forward looking discourse. He envisions ongoing dialogues that can be endlessly
interpreted, ensuring the livelihood of literary critics but offering little guidance to subjects seeking to escape time.
Perhaps both the discursive and empirical subjects seek to
escape time because to be in time is to be confronted with the
effects of time that are manifest in the empirical world. Even
if the discursive self does not exist in the empirical world it can
observe what happens there. Time places demands on both
selves to decide whether or how to mitigate the effects of time
on themselves and on other empirical beings. Yet in de Man's
world, the ontological subject should not use its understanding
or knowledge or awareness of time to help the empirical self.
There is a strong temptation "for the ironic [ontological] subject
to construe its function as one of assistance to the original self
and to act as if it existed for the sake of this world-bound person. This results in an immediate degradation to an intersubjective level."2 3 Intersubjectivity, communication with human
persons, is discouraged.
II.

LITERARY THEORIES OF THE SUBJECT IN A
LEGAL SETTING

Transplanted in a legal setting, de Man's discursive subject
becomes the juridical self. The literary subject, that was divided against itself and watched the empirical self without offering aid, finds its counterpart in the juridical self that is
constituted by the legal system and observes with disinterest
the human plaintiff or defendant on whom the law will act.
This gap between the juridical self and the human being is
claimed to be necessary for the legal system to function justly,
yet a legal system that functions without intersubjectivity is in
danger of producing a justice devoid of any connection to
human actions.
Even if law is viewed as a system that translates human actions into a specialized discourse to reach decisions that will
22. Id- at 98.
23. I& at 217.
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guide future actions, that discourse can so rid itself of subjective individual concerns that it results in, at best, uninformed
justice. Justice must have some connection to and awareness of
empirical existence if it is to help empirical subjects deal with
the circumstances that accompany time and death.
Although de Man sees little possibility of communication
between empirical and ontological selves, Lyotard indirectly acknowledges that important relationships exist between the two.
In discussing what justice means, Lyotard defines death in empirical terms as "the form of a possible interruption of the social bond, which is simply called 'death' in all of its forms:
imprisonment, unemployment, repression, hunger, anything
you want. Those are all deaths." This empirical description
of death appears almost accidentally in an ontological discussion of death as a possible outcome of language games. Before
listing these empirical forms of death, Lyotard describes the social bond discursively as "the multiplicity of games, very different among themselves, each with its own pragmatic efficacy
and its capability of positioning people in precise places in order
to have them play their parts."5 It is not clear whether these
"parts" are empirical functions or discursive roles, but at some
point (an instant de passage?) Lyotard moves from experience
to writing to observe the effects that his language games have
on the players. "The observable social bond is composed of language 'moves.'"26 He acknowledges that the social bond is
"traversed by terror, that is by the fear of death," engaging in a
discursive discussion of death, declaring as unjust any'27language
game that "owes its efficacy.., to the fear of death.
This apprehension of death in the social bond begins to answer Lyotard's question of what constitutes a just society. Lyotard seeks "an idea and practice of justice that is not linked to
that of consensus. '28 When one player demands consensus or
conformity from other players by regulating other games that
are not like it, that player is operating outside the realm of language games, in the realm of terror and death. A just society
does not demand sameness, but rather gives all players equal
access to information, enabling them to make knowledgeable
decisions without the terror of expectations of performance.
24.

J. LYOTARD & J. THEBAUD, JUST GAMING 99 (W. Godzich trans. 1985).

25. Id.
26.

J. LYOTARD, THE POSTMODERN CONDmON: A REPORT ON KNOWLEDGE

(G. Bennington & B. Massumi trans. 1984).
27.

J. LYOTARD & J. THEBAUD, supra note 24, at 99.

28.

ML at 66.
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Equal access would allow for ongoing language games "of perfect information at any given moment. But they would also be
non-zero-sum games, and by virtue of that fact, discussion
would never risk fixating in a position of minimax equilibrium
because it had exhausted its stakes. '29 Lyotard's guarantee
against fixating, like de Man's provision for never ending interpretation, leads only to a perpetual, discursive existence, a language game with no end. Is this the immortality - the justice
they seek?
For Lyotard as for de Man, language is again the means to
the discursive immortality of continuity. Lyotard's endless language games reduce discourse to a level of sheer operativity.
Each question engenders another and delegitimates what the
previous answer established, posing further questions, without
end. Paralogy - the process of questioning and delegitimating
existing knowledge - forms the legitimating basis for scientific
discourse. For Lyotard, this pragmatics of science provides
paralogy with legitimate status for defining all discourse:
The function of the differential or imaginative or paralogical activity
of the current pragmatics of science is to point out these
metaprescriptives (science's "presuppositions") and to petition the
players to accept different ones. The only legitimation that can make
this kind of request admissible is that it will generate ideas, in other
words, new statements.3 0

Paralogy fills a generative role and allows scientific and other
discourses to continue. The legitimation of discourse fuels the
delegitimating process of unseating established rules and replacing'them with newer metaprescriptives that will themselves eventually be replaced. Lyotard terms this process the
"quest for paralogy" 31 and identifies it as the best hope for a
just society.
Lyotard's paralogy-based society has the ability to turn out
volumes of new knowledge in the form of new statements. Yet
his description of that society as it was taking shape in the late
1970s raises some troubling questions: "[t]he temporary contract is favored by the system due to its greater flexibility,
lower cost, and the creative turmoil of its accompanying motivations - all of these factors contribute to increased operativity."32 Operativity has negative connotations for both the
empirical and ontological self, evoking visions of countless,
29.
30.
31.
32.

Id-at 67.
Id at 65.
I& at 66.
Id.
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highly efficient subjects engaging in the endless activity of generating discourse and language games. Whether they engage in
this activity at the empirical or discursive level, both the empirical and discursive subjects' hopes for justice are based only on
assurances that they will be heard in this flood of new statements and new language games. A just system must accept the
plurality of language games, then grant each game validity
(although some will be less valid than others). The just system
must not tolerate one player totalizing, threatening or killing
others by demanding their allegiance, and it must provide equal
access to information. But even if each player is assured these
protections, it is not clear how justice will be served in a society
where discourse leads only to delegitimating utterances and the
creation of more information rather than to action.
Lyotard envisions his just society operating on an ontological level more than an empirical level. He speaks of persons in
discursive roles, as players of language games: "Basically, minorities are not social ensembles; they are territories of language. Every one of us belongs to several minorities, and what
is very important, none of them prevails. ' '33 Elsewhere he
speaks of "forms of language games, that is ways of playing that
language has that position the person who enters into the game.
This person may enter here or there, he or she will be positioned by the game; in this sense, language is indeed not, and
cannot be, mastered. ' '34 Even the most empirical of his hypothetical game players 35 acknowledge their discursive subjectivity and subjection to language, one stating that "language
cannot be mastered. It is something that I do not manipulate
'3 6
This subject, acknowledging
... it does not come from me."
that language comes from outside its empirical self, poses a
striking contrast to de Man's "self that writes" that constitutes
its own language. Yet, both views of subjectivity transpose empirical human beings to the level of linguistic existence.
Only Lyotard's interest in avoiding deadly totalitarian impulses (where players threaten others with some form of death
to gain compliance) suggests the possibility that his just society
33. Id at 95.
34. Id. at 98.
35. Referring to Hasidic narratives from the time of the French Revolution, which Martin Buber collected under the name Gog and Magog, Lyotard
hypothesizes that Hasidic sages condemned Robespierre and the Jacobins for
failing to "respect the plurality of language games," by attempting to extend
their idea of justice to all conduct and discourse. Id. at 97-98.
36. Id. at 98.
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may have some commensurability with the empirical world its
subjects inhabit. Lyotard states: "The question you are asking
is: What type of relation is there between justice and the various language games?"3 7 Lyotard sees this relation as one of
openness to the very variety of those games, recognizing individual conversations as legitimate and delegitimating: "And so,
when the question of what justice consists in is raised, the answer is: 'It remains to be seen in each case.' "s This reference
to "each case" may indicate an underlying concern for the
plight of each empirical individual on whom the claimed system
of justice operates. It is more likely, however, that discursiveness holds the most interest for Lyotard's conception of justice.
IV.

THEORIES OF THE SUBJECT IN LAW

Curiously, while structuralist, anti-realist literary critics
have sought to separate the empirical from the discursive
selves, some legal critics with antirealist tendencies Vvant to
lessen the distance between the two. By introducing more
overtly political elements into their theory, some critical legal
theorists, more than their literary counterparts, draw on the
concerns of empirical subjects to inform their theoretical models. The literary critics' interest in the subject's discursive,
structural function resurfaces in some critical legal scholarship
as a concern for the independence of self and an attempt to
lessen the control of "Structure" over "Self." 39 While sharing
this concern for the subject, non-critical legal scholars offer different realist theories to support the independent self.
Professor Steve Fuller 40 seeks a justice that would acknowledge the individual empirical subject but would do so
with a realistic assessment of the subject's cognitive limitations.4 ' He advocates a realist "political metatheory of irrationalism" to counter the anti-realist, rational critical tradition that
denies the effects of human fallibility in matters of scientific
and political knowledge. 42 Basing his theory of justice on "scientific realism," Fuller draws on an empirical, realist tradition
that explains error "in terms of our beliefs running up against
an independently existing reality [whereas] the general an37. I& at 96.
38. 1&Lat 99.
39.
critical
40.
41.
42.

Fuller, supra note 4, at 575-76 n.52 Fuller's footnote challenges this
legal studies model of Structure versus Self.
I&
See id at 554-56.
Id at 579.
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tirealist strategy explains error in terms of two or more perspectives conflicting over some situation. '43 This anti-realist

strategy, which elsewhere Fuller identifies as belonging to "the
'conversation of mankind' school of politics," is manifest in
the endless discourse encountered in Lyotard and de Man. For
scientific realists like Fuller, this endless discourse cannot
serve empirical individuals because it does not recognize their
45
cognitive limitations.
Fuller criticizes certain critical legal scholars for ignoring
limitations on empirical beings. If these limitations were understood, they could be overcome or sufficiently adjusted to enable those subjects to work within both the legal system and
46
the larger society to improve their own collective condition.
47
He particularly disagrees with Joseph William Singer, who
identifies four very empirically-based general goals that
describe a social vision: to prevent cruelty, alleviate misery, democratize illegitimate hierarchies and alter the social condi48
tions that cause loneliness.
Singer's goal of aiding the empirical individual is just one
form in which critical legal scholarship seeks to promote the
subject's empowerment. His work draws on that of other antiempirical, anti-realist scholars to show how the legal system is
not and should not be grounded on "determinant, objective and
neutral decision procedures. '49 Singer's anti-empiricism is
slightly different from that found in de Man and Lyotard.
Singer acknowledges the needs of empirical subjects. He wants
to alleviate the pain associated with the empirical realities of
cruelty, misery, and loneliness, but fails to recognize other empirical characteristics of the subjects he wants to help.
Although Fuller shares Singer's interest in empowering
the subject within the legal system, he criticizes certain Critical
Legal Scholars' limited anti-realist views of the system's ability
to oppress the self.5 0 Rather, Fuller blames the structure much
less than the self for perpetuating a power imbalance that may,
in fact, be more perceived than actual: "Now what is the evi43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
sponse
49.
50.

Id at 558.
Id at 580.
Id at 580 n.62.
See supra note 5.
Singer, supra note 4.
Id. at 67-70. Much of Fuller's article, supra note 4, is in direct reto Singer, supra note 4.
Fuller, supra note 4, at 575 n.52.
Id. at 575.

LAW AND LITERATURE

1991]

dence for the existence of this overbearing Structure [society]?
Unger 5l and the rest seem to rely on only two sources: the uniformity of legal language and the frequent frustration of Self's
[individual's] interests."5 2 Fuller considers the ignorance inherent in empirical individuals to be a primary cause of these
scholars' failure to account for the cause of Structure's resistance to Self's initiatives. Fuller states:
After all, social structures may not be so resistant to change if individuals have a competent understanding of how they work. Short of
such an understanding, however, these individuals can easily end up
undermining their own efforts and magnifying the apparent stability
of the social structures, by misinterpreting their ignorance as signs of
active social resistance - yet another case of the antirealist
reifying
53
what is, in fact, the product of our cognitive limitations.

Fuller calls for empirical subjects to learn how their systems of justice and society operate in order to engage that
structural, functional information in their favor. The subject's
decision to learn how to "get inside" the legal system could be
the very link that Lyotard's paralogical language games need to
move beyond operativity without returning to an externally imposed performativity. If invested with an understanding of
their real, cognitive limitations, the players in Lyotard's endless
language games could assume the self-directed task of introducing new prescriptives into the legal system.
Although he calls for individual persons to learn, and acknowledges their capacity to do so, Fuller warns against putting too much faith in the power of the individual to change the
legal system. Fuller accepts Unger's position that each new
case is "an opportunity for either reproducing or destabilizing
the bias" of the legal structure, but chides him for failing to
notice that:
the legal system is sufficiently independent of the wills of particular
individuals - indeterminacy and all - that if a concerted and systematic effort is not made to destabilize the regnant biases on a mass
level, then the few isolated pockets of successful
self-empowerment
55
will appear as minor statistical aberrations.

Fuller calls for an empowerment of the individual that balances
the empirical subject's cognitive limitations with her ability to
effect change.
51. Roberto Mangebeirra Unger, Professor of Law, Harvard University,
author of THE CRmTICAL LEGAL STuDIEs MOVEMENT (1986).
52. Fuller, supra note 4, at 575 n.52.

53. I&
54.
55.

I& at 572.
Id- at 572-73.
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Fuller lacks confidence that individuals will choose what is
right for them. He notes the "fallacy that just because you
know what you want, it does not follow that what you want
will turn out as you expect. '56 Further, individuals are ignorant not only about their own needs, but also about needs of
others.5 7 If enough people recognize these limitations, they will
be able to "destabilize the biases."58 This destabilization will
not, however, necessarily result from a unified group action.
Rather, it will result from enough people considering how their
own limitations affect their individual and collective needs.
Fuller's concern for the realities of human decisionmaking
processes is more in keeping with the justice of plurality that
Lyotard seeks. Fuller's empirical, cognitively limited individualism and Lyotard's plurality both question whether consensus
is an adequate vehicle for expression of individual differences.
For Lyotard, "consensus has become an outmoded and suspect
value" but justice has not. 59 Fuller claims that consensus is unstable because subjects are ignorant about what others want:
The fact that people continue to go their way, even against the will of
their representative, is at least as much due to the representative's
cognitive inability to monitor what the people are thinking as to [the
people] actually changing their minds. Indeed, the preponderance of
"second-order" ignorance that members of a community have about
what one another thinks accounts for the volatility of public opinion,
60
especially in democratic societies.

Legislators and judges cannot, as Fuller accuses Singer of assuming, "deliberately bring into existence a consensually desirable social order." 6' 1 Fuller even suggests that consensus may
be a myth: "Recent studies in public discourse suggest that societies coalesce, not around values or ideas, but around contained areas of disagreement. [One] conclusion is that the glue
binding societies together is, in short, the acceptance of dissensus."62 A dissensus based on an awareness of individual cognitive limitations may be the empirical version of Lyotard's
discursive plurality of justice.
Although Fuller acknowledges the existence of a few successful pockets of self empowerment in the legal system, he
does not suggest specific examples of how mass systemic biases
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.

Id-at 578.
Id at 576.
I& at 572.
J. LYOTARD, supra note 26, at 66.
Fuller, supra note 4, at 576.
Id. at 577.
Id at 576-77 n.56.
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have been overcome. Other scholars 63 have suggested that the
law of sexual harassment as one of the most visible areas in
which subjects have made their voices heard persistently
enough to change the legal system. Behaviors that once were
not actionable, and often even socially acceptable, eventually
were granted legitimacy as legal wrongs in the judicial system
because enough victims repeatedly identified such behaviors as
socially wrong. In a case of social discourse speaking to legal
discourse, societal disapproval finally led to legal sanction for
offenses of sexual harassment.6 4 This progression followed Lyotard's prescription for justice: "Justice here does not consist
merely in the observance of the rules; as in all the games, it
consists in working at the limits of what the rules permit, in order to invent new moves, perhaps new rules and therefore new
65
games."
Noonan, too, calls for the legal system to give voice to the
individuals who are subject to its acts and omissions, and is concerned that the legal system clearly hear the human voice. He
harshly criticizes law for masking the humanity of all who take
part in it, the lawyers, judges, plaintiffs and defendants: "By
mask I mean a legal construct suppressing the humanity of a
participant in the process .... 'Property,' applied to a person, is
a perfect mask. No trace of human identity remains. ' 66 Legal
constructs are too far removed from empirical experience and
mask realities that stem from the empirical subject's experience of time and death. Two examples Noonan uses to illustrate law's masking power involve laws or cases that are
generally familiar to all lawyers and to many non-lawyers:
slavery laws in pre-revolutionary Virginia and Judge Benjamin
Cardozo's opinion in Palsgraf v. The Long Island Railroad
Company.6'
The Virginia slavery control and property statutes of the
63. This brief sketch of how the legal claim for sexual harassment developed draws on lectures by University of Minnesota Law Professor Gerald
Torres, particularly his consideration of MacKinnon, Sexual Harassment- Its
FirstDecade in Court, in C. MACKINNON, supra note 4, at 103-16.
64. MacKinnon claims that the sexually harassed victim/subject came to
define the harm to her: "The legal claim for sexual harassment marks the
first time in history, to my knowledge, that women have defined women's injuries in a law." Id. at 105. Victims were "given a forum, legitimacy to speak,
authority to make claims, and an avenue for possible relief. What happened to
them was all right. Now it is not," Id. at 104.
65. J. LYOTARD & J. THEBAUD, supra note 24, at 100.
66. J. NooNAN, J&, supra note 4, at 20.
67. 248 N.Y. 339, 162 N.E. 99 (1928).
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1770s purposefully distanced slaves from the world of men and
women. Although slaves felt the statutes' effects most directly
and painfully, the statutes were not really addressed to them:
"Addressees of the property statutes were only in an incidental
way the slaves themselves. In theory, as real estate or personal
estate, they could not be addressed at all. Definition as property determined [almost everything about them]. They could
not, however, apply this law to themselves. 6 8s The only way
lawmakers - in this case Thomas Jefferson and his teacher
George Whythe - could justify slavery, when as white, male
revolutionaries they were seeking "universal liberty," was to
mask slaves' humanity with the label and law of property.
The juridical construction that gives this (non-)status to
slaves involves a purposeful disregard for the empirical, human
person behind the legally constructed mask. A similar disinterest in empirical circumstances occurs in de Man's discursive
world, albeit in different form. His theory of the "self that
writes" is presented as freeing the subject from the constraints
of time and the empirical world. Yet it offers no hope to the
empirical being enslaved in an externally imposed system of
slavery. The discursive self cannot speak across systems to the
empirical subject, but can merely watch the empirical self suf69
fer the effects of time and death.
A discursive subject, constituted by law rather than its own
self, appears again in the masks imposed on Helen Palsgraf.70
Judge Noonan provides extensive detail about factors that the
court omitted from its opinion to indicate how artificially removed judicial decisions can be from the events that engendered them. A single statement from William Prosser, twentyfive years after the decision, brings home Noonan's point better
than any amount of factual detail: "[A]s described in the opinion the event could not possibly have happened. '71 Even more
striking is that this statement did not matter to most law
professors, commentators or students.72 The law had constituted its own language and subjects; too much was riding on its
constructions to acknowledge its unstable foundations.
The disregard of empirical events in Palsgraf(to the extent
they could be documented) is reminiscent of de Man in a
68.

J. NOONAN, JR., supra note 4, at 42.

69. See supra notes 23-25 and accompanying text.
70. Helen Palsgraf was the plaintiff in Palsgraf,248 N.Y. at 339, 162 N.E.
at 99.
71. J. NOONAN, JR., supra note 4, at 119.
72. Id
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slightly different way than the slavery example. De Man's approach to criticism requires "that we must begin by forgetting
all the facts." 73 By constructing its own version of "the facts"
of a given case, the law also forgets certain facts. Many players
and processes operate to constitute the final set of facts recited
in a judicial opinion. The parties' versions of the facts as told to
their lawyers and on deposition to opposing counsel, the facts
attorneys recite in pleadings, the facts to which the parties stipulate, and the judicial clerk's condensation of the facts for use
in the final written opinion combine to present a set of "facts"
that "forget" the facts of the case.
In the guise of a sincere interest in recreating events "as
they happened," the legal authority requesting "the facts" is
carefully selecting material for its own limited discourse. The
legal system wants only those facts that it deems "relevant,"
and will shape and reconstitute those facts into its legal discourse. The literary discursive subject escaping its "factual"
empirical existence is also escaping time. Similarly, the legal
system's discursive subject is removed from time, but in a process that may be more related to empirical death than discursive life.
De Man, Lyotard, Fuller and Noonan each seek a structural understanding of certain discursive systems. De Man and
Lyotard are interested in structure because it is a means of escaping temporal limitations. For Fuller, individuals may more
effectively challenge and change structures that they have tried
to understand, provided that they also recognize their own cognitive fallibility. Noonan is particularly interested in the structural device of a linguistic mask, in order to better understand
how to remove it so that "persons speak to persons, heart unmasked to heart."74 In all these structural inquiries secondary,
but not contradictory, interest in intersubjectivity and in the
"self that writes" appears in some form. Each critic wants the
subject to play some constitutive role in the language that will
affect it, whether on a discursive or empirical level. The danger comes when the self that writes communicates only with itself or only within its given discursive system, be it literature
or law. Each discursive or empirical self writes its own language, retaining control and focus over that language. If the
73. R. MOYNIHAN, A RECENT IMAGINING:

INTERvIEWS WITH HAROLD

BLOOM, GEOFFREY HARTMAN, J. HILLIS MILLER, PAUL DE MAN (1986). De Man

attributes to Jean Jacques Rousseau this admonition to forget all the facts. Id
74. J. NOONAN, JR., supra note 4, at 167.
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subject focuses inward and looks only at its own constituted
language, the subject may think it is sharing that language with
others when, in fact, it is only talking and not listening. This is
the danger of de Man's model. The ontological subject is too
easily trapped in a repetitive discursive realm and is unable to
offer assistance to the empirical self or other discursive selves.
Fuller's call for the self to understand its own limitations in the
empirical world may provide some room for the subject in the
self-writing model to listen to concerns outside itself.
Fuller's approach to the problem of how the self is constituted in the legal system accounts for human cognitive fallibility, but does not deny individuals their say in their legal
system. This returns us to the very formulation that began this
Essay's inquiry: "the relation of love to power." For Fuller and
Noonan, the legal system must deal appropriately with fallible,
empirical beings and must relate as a power to empirical subjects' strengths and weaknesses. For Lyotard, the discourse of
justice - the discourse in power - must listen to and contain
multiple voices or it will become a power that kills. It is almost
in giving up its constitutive power that the discursive system of
justice relates best to its subjects:
But there are language games in which the important thing is to listen, in which the rule deals with audition. Such a game is the game of
the just. And in this game, one speaks only inasmuch as one listens,
75
that is, one speaks as a listener, and not as an author.

When subjects have a stronger constitutive voice in the discursive system of law, when the legal discourse listens to the empirical and ontological concerns of its subjects, the legal system
can better serve its subjects. Subject can speak to system and,
in time, shape its operation and structure.

75.

J. LYOTARD & J. THEBAUD, supra note 24, at 71-72.

